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The Role of Marriage in Fighting HIV: A Quantitative
Illustration for Malawi
By JEREMY GREENWOOD, PHILIPP KIRCHER, CEZAR SANTOS AND MICHÈLE TERTILT
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a great health and
development challenge. According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), 36.7 million peo-
ple were living with the HIV virus in 2015.
Around 70 percent of those lived in Sub-Saharan
Africa. It is well known that number of sexual
partners matters for the transmission of HIV. To
the extent that marriage reduces the number of
partners that a person has it may play an impor-
tant role in mitigating the transmission of HIV.
Despite its significance, the literature has not
provided models in which marriage provides a
haven for safer sex. This paper investigates, us-
ing a calibrated choice-theoretic general equilib-
rium model, how policies aimed at increasing
marriage rates affect HIV prevalence rates. The
analysis highlights the role that marriage as an
institution plays in the transmission of HIV. It
also illustrates that policies aimed at marriage
may have important effects.
Choice-theoretic models of infectious dis-
eases are rare, and those entertaining marriage
are virtually nonexistent. Epidemiological mod-
els do not incorporate rational, maximizing be-
havior by individuals. Kremer (1996) builds
some behavior into an epidemiological model,
but his framework is not designed for quan-
titative analysis. An exception is the choice-
theoretic general equilibrium model by Green-
wood et al. (2017). They develop a quantita-
tive search model with various choice margins:
marriage or short-term sexual relationships, the
latter with or without a condom. Their model is
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calibrated to the Malawian data. It is used to un-
derstand the impact of “medical” interventions
aimed at changing transmission risk and mortal-
ity: antiretroviral treatment (ART) and circum-
cision in particular. The analysis allows for feed-
back effects in equilibrium, arising from chang-
ing behavior and shifts in the prevalence of HIV.
The current study extends their analysis to focus
on a different set of interventions, which do not
alter transmission risk in a medical sense, but in-
stead target the institution of marriage. Specifi-
cally, it studies social interventions aimed at en-
couraging marriage and dissuading divorce.
I. Model Description
For the sake of space, only a brief descrip-
tion of the model is given here; for details, see
Greenwood et al. (2017). Imagine an econ-
omy populated with men and women that are
born each period as healthy individuals. They
may engage in sex, which is a risky decision be-
cause of the presence of the HIV/AIDS virus.
A person may have short-term or long-term re-
lationships (aka marriages). A condom, which
reduces the likelihood of contracting the virus,
may or may not be used in a short-term rela-
tionship. Condoms are never used within a mar-
riage. It is assumed that married individuals are
faithful to their partners. In order to find a part-
ner, a person must exert costly search effort. A
person can always choose to be abstinent by not
searching for a partner.
Individuals live for multiple periods, subject
to a survival probability. They discount future
utility. People are heterogeneous with respect to
their discount factor; i.e., some individuals are
patient and others aren’t. In particular, as people
age they may stochastically switch to becoming
more patient. This feature captures the fact that
young individuals are more inclined to engage
in risky behavior than are older ones. The pe-
riod utility depends on one’s consumption and
whether he or she had sex. Having protected sex
1
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in the period (i.e., using a condom) yields instan-
taneous utility p. Unprotected sex is valued by
the person at u > p. Following evidence from
Malawi, all sex within long-term relationships
is unprotected. Within marriage, an individual
realizes extra utility (a benefit or cost) from the
partnership, given by l R 0, so that the instan-
taneous utility of sex is given by u C l. The pa-
rameter l plays a starring role in the story to be
told; it controls the exogenous benefit from mar-
riage.
When a healthy individual has sex with an in-
fected partner, he or she may contract the virus.
Following the medical evidence, the probability
of infection is assumed to be higher for women
than for men. This probability is lower for both
genders when a condom is used. Moreover, men
may be circumcised or not. Circumcised men
are less likely to contract the virus.1 For simplic-
ity, after each period all individuals get tested for
HIV. So, they know their infection status after
one period. The results of the test are an individ-
ual’s private information. An infected individ-
ual has a probability of developing HIV/AIDS
symptoms. When symptoms develop, an indi-
vidual has a higher chance of dying. Assume
that people with symptoms are too sick to en-
gage in sexual relationships.
Each person must exert effort in order to
find a partner. Since there are different types
of relationships, this search effort may be di-
rected toward three different “markets.” All par-
ticipants in the first market are seeking a pro-
tected short-term relationship. In the second
market, matched individuals engage in unpro-
tected short-term relations. Finally, in the third
market, people marry and form long-term part-
nerships. Search is costly in terms of utility.
On this, it is presumed that finding a partner in
the long-term market is more costly than find-
ing a partner in one of the short-term markets.
Each market is uniquely characterized by the
types of people that enter it: healthy/sick women
and healthy/sick men (who may be circumcised
or not). People know the prevalence rate of
HIV in each of the three markets, implied by
the composition of the participants. An equi-
1Another variable that affects the transmission of the
HIV/AIDS virus is whether the individual is under ART. The
analysis uses Malawian data for 2004, when virtually nobody
was treated. So, ART is abstracted from here. See Greenwood et
al. (2017) for an analysis of the impact of ART.
librium transfer between men and women guar-
antees that each market clears. These trans-
fers represent courtship costs. Individuals first
search in the long-term market. If he or she is
not matched, the person moves to the short-term
markets where s/he may search simultaneously
both in the protected and unprotected markets.
If matched in the long-term market, the relation-
ship can break up due to one of the spouses de-
veloping symptoms or due to an exogenous di-
vorce shock that hits the couple with probability
. This parameter is also central in the analysis
because it governs the duration of a marriage.
A person chooses their search behavior to maxi-
mize their expected discounted lifetime utility.
The analysis will focus on steady states. An
equilibrium for this economy is a collection
of prices, value functions, policy functions for
search effort, and distributions of individuals in
each market such that: i) each person maximizes
his or her expected lifetime utility, given prices
and prevalence rates; ii) prices adjust to clear all
three sex markets; and iii) aggregate HIV rates
in all markets are consistent with the behavior
of men and women.
II. Calibration
Some parameter values for the model are cho-
sen following evidence from the medical litera-
ture. These parameters are the female-to-male
and male-to-female transmission rates for pro-
tected and unprotected sex, which can also vary
depending upon whether the male is circum-
cised or not. The number of circumcised males
is taken from the Malawian data. Other para-
meters (mostly related to preferences) are cali-
brated such that the moments generated from the
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model line up with their data counterparts. Sta-
tistics regarding sexual behavior and HIV preva-
lence rates in Malawi are used as data targets.
The model fit is good in terms of targeted and
non-targeted statistics, except for the marriage
rate for young women. In particular, the model
does a good job hitting life cycle and cross-
country moments that were not used in the cali-
bration. See Greenwood et al. (2017) for details.
III. Results
Table 1 presents the results. Column 1, Panel
A, provides some data for Malawi regarding
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both HIV prevalence rates and some measures
of sexual behavior. Women exhibit a higher
prevalence of HIV/AIDS than men. This gender
asymmetry arises because the male-to-female
transmission rate is higher than the female-to-
male rate. The benchmark model also displays
such a pattern, albeit a little weaker, as can be
seen in Column 2, Panel A. The fraction of ca-
sual encounters is 18 percent in the data, a num-
ber closely matched by the model. A condom is
used in around one third of short-term relation-
ships, both in the data and model. The fraction
of singles in the population is slightly higher in
the model (48 percent versus 33 in the data).
Two experiments will now be entertained; viz,
an increase in l and a decrease in . Recall that
l measures the exogenous extra period utility
from being in a marriage. So, an upward move-
ment in l can be thought of as a policy that en-
courages marriage. Such a shift should raise the
flow into marriage. Designing tax and welfare
system to support marriage are commonly men-
tioned policies. Promoting abstinence before
marriage and providing marriage skills courses
are others. Remember that  controls the proba-
bility of divorce. Hence, a drop in  corresponds
to a policy that dissuades divorce. A fall in 
reduces the exit rate from marriage and there-
fore raises the duration of a long-term relation-
ship. Providing marriage counselling services,
promoting faithfulness through churches, or re-
quiring divorced fathers to pay child support are
examples of policies in this regard.
A. General Equilibrium Experiments
First, consider the impact of a policy that pro-
motes marriage, or that increases l. The results
for this experiment are reported in Column 3,
Panel A. The fraction of singles decreases in
the benchmark model from 48 to 44 percent.
The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate drops to 8.4 per-
cent. Second, entertain the impact of a policy
that dissuades divorce, or that decreases . Now,
for comparability purposes, the decline in  is
engineered to deliver the same drop in singles
as the previous experiment. Note however that
the HIV prevalence rate now falls by a smaller
amount to 9.6 percent (Column 4, Panel A). So,
promoting marriage appears to be more effective
than dissuading divorce on this dimension.
One of the reasons for the discrepancy in
prevalence rates across the two experiments is
the timing of entry into marriage. Although, by
construction, the number of singles decreases by
the same amount in both experiments, the tim-
ing for a first marriage is different. Note that the
fraction of married men and women by age 22
increases substantially in the promote-marriage
experiment, whereas it does so by a much lower
magnitude in the reduce-divorce counterfactual.
Therefore, the young move faster into safer
long-term relationships in the promote-marriage
exercise. Consequently, they spend a shorter
time as a young single. And, young singles
tend to be more promiscuous and have a higher
proclivity to engage in unprotected sex, because
they have lower discount factors.
Condom usage increases in both experiments
by about 1 percentage point. More of an indi-
vidual’s life will be lived in long-term relation-
ships (where sex is assumed to be always unpro-
tected). Hence, a person opts for a safer alter-
native while single, even though that brings less
enjoyment.
B. Small Field Experiments
Small field experiments apply some sort of
“treatment” to a small group of individuals and
then examine the upshot. To mimic a small field
experiment in the choice-theoretic general equi-
librium model, shifts in the behavior of indi-
viduals are not allowed to affect the aggregate
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the three types of
markets for relationships. The idea here is that
because a small field experiment is local in na-
ture, it cannot have a global impact on economy-
wide aggregates. Thus, a small field experiment
is a partial equilibrium investigation.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the results for the
small field experiments. Interpret these numbers
as what happens to the small group of individ-
uals who are subjected to the experiment; i.e.,
the “treated” group. The macro aggregates for
society are not affected by the experiment be-
cause it applies to a measure zero set of individ-
uals. Therefore, the macro aggregates remain
constant at the benchmark model values (Col-
umn 2, Panel A).
Focus initially on the promote-marriage sce-
nario in Column 3. Note that the HIV preva-
lence rate in the small field experiment drops
(by slightly less compared with its equilibrium
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counterpart) from 10.3 to 8.7 percent (compare
Column 2, Panel A, with Column 3, Panel B).
Now, in the small field experiment the treated
group is still interacting with a population at
large that is just as risky as that in the bench-
mark equilibrium. The behavioral response of
the treated group to the policy leads to a substan-
tial reduction in the prevalence of the disease
for the experimental subjects. In fact, these be-
havioral responses are stronger than in the equi-
librium experiment (compare Column 3, Panel
A with Column 3, Panel B). For instance, the
number of singles decreases 1 percentage point
further to 43 percent. In the small field exper-
iment there are more infected people in aggre-
gate than in the equilibrium experiment. Hence,
people look harder for safer long-term relation-
ships. Note also that, in comparison with the
equilibrium experiment, the fraction of men and
women married by age 22 increases by an even
larger extent. Moreover, while single, individ-
uals in the small field experiment also behave
more cautiously. The fraction of people that use
condoms rises by approximately 1 percentage
point (over the equilibrium experiment) and the
fraction of singles who had sex in the previous
year declines slightly.
Now turn attention to the small field experi-
ment for the reduce-divorce counterfactual (Col-
umn 4, Panel B). The HIV prevalence rate wanes
from 10.3 to 9.6 percent (contrast Column 2,
Panel A with Column 4, Panel B). In fact, this
decline is very similar to what was obtained in
the equilibrium experiment (Column 4, Panel
A). This suggests that most of the effect from
the reduce-divorce policy comes from behav-
ioral changes and not from equilibrium effects,
as will be seen in the next sub-section. Not sur-
prisingly then, behavior in the small field exper-
iment is very similar to the equilibrium version.
C. Epidemiological Experiment
Epidemiological studies typically hold human
behavior fixed after shifts in public policy. To
capture this, the search intensities in the three
markets for various relationships are taken, for
each type of individual, from the benchmark
equilibrium model. These are then used in the
epidemiological experiment. The epidemiolog-
ical experiment can only be conducted for the
reduce-divorce policy. To understand why, con-
sider the promote-marriage scenario. Here, the
utility benefit of marriage is increased. This can
only operate through changes in behavior. If
changes in behavior are shut down, then poli-
cies that promote marriage cannot have an ef-
fect. Turn attention now to the reduce-divorce
policy. This does have effects beyond shifts in
behavior. Changing the exogenous probability
of divorce, , mechanically alters the duration of
a marriage and consequently the flow of people
from married into single life, even when behav-
ior is held fixed. This has an impact on society’s
health.
The results for the epidemiological experi-
ment for the reduce-divorce policy are reported
in Column 4, Panel C. Here, the HIV prevalence
rate only drops slightly from 10.3 to 10.1 per-
cent (juxtapose Column 2, Panel A with Col-
umn 4, Panel C). To explain this, observe that
the number of singles does not fall as much as
in the equilibrium experiment (Column 2, Panel
A versus Column 4, Panel C). The extra mar-
riages that result in the equilibrium experiment
are due to behavioral adjustments. If given the
chance, individuals search harder for long-term
relationships, because they know these will now
last longer and this economizes on search costs.
As just discussed, the behavioral shifts in
the equilibrium reduce-divorce experiment rein-
force the mechanical effect on marriage due a
decrease in the rate of divorce. This contrasts
with the behavioral responses from medical ex-
periments. Suppose some treatment makes an
individual less likely to contract the virus. This
mechanically induces a force that will reduce
HIV, holding fixed behavior. When faced with
the lower odds of contracting HIV, however, in-
dividuals will engage in riskier activities. This
increase in risky sexual activity works to coun-
teract the effect that the reduction in transmis-
sion risk has on HIV. See Greenwood et al
(2017) for a discussion of these effects.
REFERENCES
Greenwood, Jeremy, Philipp Kircher,
Cezar Santos and Michèle Tertilt. 2017. “An
Equilibrium Model of the African HIV/AIDS
Epidemic.” working paper.
Kremer, Michael. 1996. “Integrating Be-
havioral Choice into Epidemiological Models
of AIDS.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
111 (2): 549-573.
VOL. 107 NO. 5 MARRIAGE AND HIV 5
TABLE 1—DATA, BENCHMARK MODEL, AND EXPERIMENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Malawian Benchmark Marriage Divorce
Data Model l "  #
Panel A: Equilibrium Experiments
HIV/AIDS rate 11.8 10.3 8.4 9.6
-Men 10 8.6 7.1 8.1
-Women 13 12.1 9.8 11.2
Casual Sex 18 15.7 13.5 14.0
Casual Sex with condom 39 32.8 33.9 33.7
Singles, sex last year 37 53.5 54.2 54.2
Singles 33 48.0 44.0 44.0
Married by age 22, men 58 57.2 63.9 59.0
Married by age 22, women 90 62.6 68.4 64.5
Panel B: Small Field Experiments
HIV/AIDS rate 8.7 9.6
-Men 6.8 8.0
-Women 10.7 11.4
Casual Sex 12.9 14.0
Casual Sex with condom 34.7 33.6
Singles, sex last year 54.0 54.7
Singles 43.0 43.6
Married by age 22, men 66.6 60.5
Married by age 22, women 66.8 64.0





Casual Sex with condom 33.0
Singles, sex last year 54.3
Singles 45.4
Married by age 22, men 57.2
Married by age 22, women 62.6
Note: Column 1 shows the Malawian data. The results from the benchmark DSGE model are displayed in Column 2. Column 3 shows
the results from a policy experiment aiming to promote marriage. This is operationalized by letting l rise from -4.8 to -4.2. The results
from a policy experiment dissuading divorce are presented in Column 4. Here  falls from 0.03 to 0.025. For the small field experiments
the feedback loop is shut down from individual behavior to the aggregate prevalence rates in each of the three relationship markets.
That is, the small field experiment is not allowed to affect economy-wide aggregates. Therefore, the results reported for the small field
experiment are for the “treated” subjects only and are not the economy-wide aggregates, which remain the same as in Column 2. In
the epidemiological experiment the search intensities, for each type of individual, from the benchmark DSGE model are used; i.e.,
individual behavior is not allowed to change. All numbers in the table are in percents.
Source: See Greenwood et al. (2017) for the Malawian data sources and a complete description of the DSGE benchmark model,
together with a listing of all parameter values used.
